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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to analyze the effect of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) on the 
retention behavior of the United States Naval Academy (USNA) graduate Navy and 
Marine Corps junior officers one year after their minimum service obligation (MSO). 
The data used for the analyses covers cohorts from 1990 to 2007. Three logistic 
regression models were constructed to estimate the impact of increasing operational 
tempo due to the GWOT. Three separate models were created for the Marine Corps to 
measure the effect of hostile deployments. The models included demographic, service, 
and deployment variables, as well as a difference-in-difference estimator to capture the 
effect of the GWOT. 
Deployments either before or after the GWOT had a positive effect on the 
retention behavior for both the Navy and the Marine Corps. However, hostile deployment 
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The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps (USMC) constitute a large portion of the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and have a great effect on and significance in 
implementing the strategic goals of the United States of America in the continental U.S. 
and around the world. Maintaining the capability of the Navy and USMC has always 
been a critical issue for decision makers. A successful and careerist officer corps is one of 
the top priorities of management at every level of human resource planning. The 
efficiency of an armed force depends on the quality of its leaders, which has been proven 
true throughout the history. In the light of this idea, educating, training, and retaining 
these experienced and quality officers is vital for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. 
The U.S. Navy has the following three main commissioning sources: The United 
States Naval Academy (USNA), the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC), 
and the Officer Candidate School (OCS). While the USNA is the most expensive source 
among these three, it has the highest rate of retention, followed by the NROTC and OCS 
(Lehner, 2008). Academy life contributes not only years of arduous education to 
midshipmen but also the training that the leadership of the Navy deliberately seeks in 
combat conditions and the inclination to stay in the Navy beyond the minimum service 
obligation (MSO). 1  
Deployment rates for all service members evidently increased during the 1990s2 
with the First Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia humanitarian efforts, and peacekeeping 
and enforcing operations, and peaked after 9/11 with the declaration of the Global War 
on Terror (GWOT), especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. The effects of an increased 
operational tempo after 9/11 have been observed for all services. With limited resources 
and increased operational commitments, defense officials want to ensure the billets are 
                                                 
1 Since the authors are only interested in active duty, when they say minimum service obligation, they 
are only referring to active duty service obligation. 
2 Operational tempo increased from 60% to 300% between 1986 and 2000 (Fricker, 2002). 
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adequately manned, trained, experienced, and equipped to respond to the full spectrum of 
military operations (Paissant, 2008). Furthermore, defense decision makers have been 
forced to understand active duty manning problems and make decisions to reverse 
potential manning problems to carry out future missions. Unless the impacts of 
deployments are fully understood, it becomes difficult to undertake the necessary actions 
to retain officers from the Naval Academy.  
Some have blamed the growing number of deployments for retention shortfalls 
and personnel losses. This view is supported by surveys in which deployment is among 
the most likely reasons cited by service members for leaving the military (Fricker, Hosek, 
and Totten, 2003). Troops are seeing deployments that are more frequent and of greater 
length, as well as shorter rest periods in between deployments — factors thought to create 
a more stressful environment for service members (Tanielian and Jaycox, 2008). 
Despite the increased levels of casualties among the officer corps and increased 
numbers of deployments to war zones with remarkably short turnarounds, the USMC has 
enjoyed outstanding popularity among midshipmen. In fact, it has become the second 
most popular choice (after Naval Aviation) of service selection in the brigade in the past 
two years  (Burroughs, 2007). 
It is not possible to predict what kind of operational tempo the Navy and Marine 
Corps are going to experience in the future, but determining the consequences of 
deployments on current retention decisions could help decision makers develop 
manpower plans for the future officer corps and avoid problems in manning leadership 
positions.  
B. THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this study is to assess if the number and the characteristics of 
deployments are associated with changes in retention rates of Naval Academy graduates 
from 1990 to 2001 who were eligible to make voluntary stay-or-leave decisions during 
the pre- and post-GWOT periods. The study aims to quantify the effects of deployment 
on the retention of junior officers.  
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The primary research question for this study is as follows: Do hostile deployments 
affect the retention decision of USNA graduates? The secondary research question is the 
following: Is there a difference in retention behavior between Naval Academy graduates 
who select the Navy versus those who select the Marine Corps in the pre- and post-
GWOT period?  
The nature of military operations has been constantly changing since the 1990s. In 
the face of changing threats, operations are covering longer periods and spreading over 
wider theaters. Consequently, deployment duration and frequency are increasing. Under 
these circumstances, defense decision makers should understand the current problems to 
ensure possible solutions in the future.  One should also be aware of the effects of other 
factors on the individuals’ intention to stay. These factors include monetary, morale, 
family, and health issues. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The second chapter of the thesis provides a review of previous studies on 
retention and the effects of deployment on retention. The third chapter provides 
information about the data. The fourth chapter covers the methodology utilized by the 
authors, which includes a brief overview of logistic regression, and a description of the 
variables and statistical models. The fifth chapter presents the results of the analysis. The 
final chapter discusses the summary, recommendations, and limitations of the study. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reports and discusses the results of previous studies on officer 
retention and enlisted reenlistment. It also discusses the data and methods used in order to 
provide a baseline for the models in this study. Most of the studies have yielded different 
results for enlisted and officer retention depending on the groups, periods, techniques and 
time-varying factors such as operational tempo and civilian employment opportunities. 
The studies have provided results on various reasons for retention and results for different 
grades, ranks, and services. 
Recent research, surprisingly, contradicts the general assumption that there is a 
negative relationship between the number of deployments and the retention behavior of 
officers. Most of the findings about officers’ decisions indicate that up to a certain level 
of deployments, about two or three deployments, officers tend to stay. The effects of 
deployments on junior officers, while smaller, are still positive.  
To get a better grasp of the situation, provide a broader view of the problem, and 
elaborate the methodology, this chapter focuses on studies of both officer and enlisted 
personnel.  
A. MARINE CORPS RETENTION IN THE POST 9/11 ERA: THE EFFECTS 
OF DEPLOYMENT TEMPO ON MARINES WITH AND WITHOUT 
DEPENDENTS BY QUESTER, HATTIANGADI, AND SHUFORD (2006) 
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Iraq and Afghanistan have been added to the 
operational plans of the U.S. Marine Corps as two critical theaters. Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) was launched in Afghanistan in October 2001, and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) was launched in March 2003. Marine Corps units have been engaged in 
intense operations since then. Viewing retention and reenlistment as two of the military’s 
most critical issues, senior military leaders have been interested in the effects of 
deployments on manpower readiness. Therefore, researchers have focused more on this 
issue recently to help decision makers predict the future effects of deployment tempo. 
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In this study, Quester, Hattiangadi and Shuford examined the effects of 
deployment tempo on the retention behavior of Marine Corps officers and enlisted 
personnel. They tried to discover the influence of dependency status and service length 
basis on deployments. They categorized officers into the following three groups: 4-6, 9-
12, and 12-20 years of service. In addition, they categorized enlistees as first, second, and 
third termers (zones A, B, and C). 
Marine Corps retention data from March 2004 to March 2005 was used for this 
study. Deployments appeared to be intense for the Marine Corps during this period. The 
authors analyzed data on the most recent retention and reenlistment decisions. Results 
from 2002 and 2003 were also looked at for comparison purposes, specifically for 
enlistees. Deployment information was taken from the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC) for both hostile and nonhostile deployments, since the Marine Corps had not 
developed a database for this kind of information. 
Researchers examined a one-year period in the post-9/11 era. The data file was 
detailed and covered an intense period of deployments. The study seemed to yield 
satisfactory results. Unobservable characteristics causing self-selection, such as 
motivation, might have been the reason for high retention rates (especially for Marine 
Corps officers), but these were hard to measure. 
The researchers used a logistic regression model to estimate the probability of 
retention. They looked into the effect of deployments on retention decisions separately 
for length-of-service categories and different dependency status. While dependency status 
appeared to be a significant factor in predicting reenlistment decisions, it had little effect 
on officer retention decisions. 
For first-term enlistees, deployments to hostile areas and a higher number of days 
deployed reduced reenlistment rates. Surprisingly, Marines with no deployment during 
their initial service period had lower reenlistment rates as well. Deployment tempo was 
found to have larger negative effects on first-term Marines without dependents than on 
those with dependents. Results revealed another interesting and substantial difference 
between Marines with and without dependents: Marines without dependents deployed 
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forty-nine days more, on average, than those with dependents did. This fact was 
explained by their tendency to volunteer for deployment, commanders’ preferences, and 
the concentration of single Marines in Primary Military Occupational Specialties 
(PMOS), which deploy more frequently to hostile regions. For second- and third-term 
Marines no apparent relationship was found between duration or frequency of 
deployment and reenlistment behavior. 
The study also examined retention rates for Marine Corps officers from March 
2004 to March 2005 and took into consideration the impact of the total number of 
deployed days in the last forth two months before stay/leave decisions (for ranks of O-2 
or higher). In their model, for all service groups they estimated logistic regression models 
and used retention rates (from March 2004 to March 2005) and retention plans (counting 
those who had not submitted separation or retirement papers as of March 2005) of 
officers as dependent variables to detect the association between deployment tempo and 
retention. 
They found that in the early years of a career (4-6 years), officers with dependents 
retained at higher rates than those without dependents. The officers without dependents 
who reached their ninth year of service stayed at higher rates than who did have 
dependents.  Deployments had a positive effect on the retention of non-retirement eligible 
officers. Deployments had an even higher effect on retention rates of officers with close 
to twenty years of service (and therefore eligible for retirement). 
B. SERVING AWAY FROM HOME: HOW DEPLOYMENTS INFLUENCE 
REENLISTMENT BY HOSEK AND TOTTEN (2002) 
This study aimed at finding whether deployments had an effect on reenlistment 
behavior. What made the research important was the increasing rates of deployment in 
the last decade and indications that deployment tempo would not decrease in the near 
future. 
The researchers suggested that deployment experiences have a direct effect on 
enlisted personnel reenlistment decisions. People attend military with some pre-set 
estimates and expectations in mind about utilities, duration or content of duty. The type 
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and number of deployments surely make up a significant portion of this, as the actual 
domestic and international characteristics of the GWOT situation is considered. Upon 
completion of deployment, members review what they acquire from their experience, 
which helps them realize their own limitations and compare their experience with what 
they expected before enlistment. These factors along with personal, monetary and civilian 
opportunity issues constitute a foundation for modeling reenlistment decisions. 
Researchers call this learning and evaluating mechanism a “Bayesian updating process.” 
In this study, Hosek and Totten initially developed an expected utility model to 
measure the effect of learning from previous episodes on the reenlistment decisions of 
first-and second-term members by service. They calculated expected utility by using 
acquired benefits (net deployment pay) and time spent at home station and in theater, 
which were functions of duration and number of deployments. That is, if obtained utility 
goes up, the rate of reenlistment also increases. This mainly provided a good basis for 
additional studies. They created two probit models to find the effect of deployments on 
reenlistment.  
The first model examined reenlistment decisions based on deployment, and two 
main specifications were used. Hostile and nonhostile deployments were included 
separately in a main-effects specification and were combined as deployment variables in 
full-interaction specifications. The latter contained type and number of deployments, 
education, the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), demographics, unemployment 
rate, and year variables to predict the reenlistment rate. In the second model, they 
calculated a main-effects specification to find the direct/indirect effects of deployment on 
speed of promotion to E-5, and then the promotion effect on reenlistment.  They also 
used reenlistment and expected promotion time to E-5 as indicators to capture the relation 
between deployment and reenlistment.  
Their results indicated that in the one-equation reenlistment model for first-
termers, deployed enlistees had reenlistment rates as high as non-deployed personnel did. 
Their results showed that reenlistment increased with the number of nonhostile 
deployments, but was unaffected by hostile deployments. In the model with interaction 
terms, enlisted personnel with three or more nonhostile or hostile deployments had lower 
 9
reenlistment rates than those with two deployments of either type. For second-termers, 
reenlistment rates appeared to rise with nonhostile deployments and up to two hostile 
deployments, which suggested some differences from the effects for first-termers. Three 
or more hostile deployments reduced the reenlistment rate, which was still higher than 
that of personnel with no hostile deployment. In their two-equation model (reenlistment 
and promotion), they detected that nonhostile deployment is associated with earlier 
promotion, while hostile deployments had little effect on promotion, a result that 
appeared to be consistent for all services. Faster promotion was associated with 
increasing income, authority, and job satisfaction that translated into higher future 
expected utility. 
Furthermore, these two researchers examined the effects of deployment with 
respect to dependency status for first-termers, based on the assumption that most second-
termers were already married. They found a positive correlation between the number of 
hostile/nonhostile deployments and reenlistment for those with dependents, while for 
those without dependents reenlistment rose less rapidly with nonhostile deployments and 
remained unchanged with hostile deployments.  
Hosek and Totten analyzed the Proxy PERSTEMPO file, which was acquired 
from the DMDC. It contained longitudinal data about personnel who were eligible to 
make stay/leave decisions between FY1996-FY1999. In addition to variables for service 
obligation, education, AFQT, demographics, year, expiration of term of service, 
unemployment rate, and dependency status information, they used hostile fire pay (HFP) 
3 and family separation allowance (FSA) to identify the number and duration of past 
deployments. FSA was paid to personnel with dependents (wife and children) who 
executed duty away from their home station for more than thirty days, while HFP was 
paid to everyone who performed duty in hostile circumstances. For those who did not 
have dependents, nonhostile deployment information was obtained from a unit 
deployment indicator. In addition, stay/leave decisions were taken to be three months 
before expiration of term of service (ETS).  
                                                 
3 HFP is now called imminent danger pay (IDP) as in the authors’ data file. 
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There were some strengths of the study. The authors initially developed a learning 
model to explain the member’s way to review his or her past experiences and a utility 
model to describe how he or she utilized this information.  The utility model was mainly 
dependent on the quality of deployments (number, frequency, length in months, 
pecuniary benefits, and cost) in order to understand explicitly the impact of past 
experiences on the member’s decisions. The model had many explanatory variables such 
as the effect of zero, one, two, and three or more deployments separately and in 
interaction. The model used these variables to estimate the connection between 
deployments and various utility combinations acquired by members with different 
experiences. The model also controlled for unobserved factors contributing to promotion 
other than deployment, and used additional variables to capture previous promotion 
history (to E-4). Deployment information was constructed from FSA and HFP data, 
which was supposed to be more dependable than self-reports or surveys. Additionally, 
data covered members’ decisions during the period from 1993 to 1999. The study had 
small weaknesses as well. The data did not contain bonus or military and civilian pay 
information, which were compensated for by using fiscal year variables as proxies for 
annual fluctuations in pay. Although deployments were measured accurately, ongoing 
operations were not included completely in terms of duration. In addition, nonhostile 
duties shorter than thirty days were not included. The researchers believed this created 
minor bias. 
C. THE EFFECTS OF PERSTEMPO ON OFFICER RETENTION IN THE 
U.S. MILITARY BY FRICKER (2002) 
The author analyzed the effects of deployment on officer retention for all services. 
Data for the research were drawn from the responses on the Survey of Active Duty 
Personnel. Junior officers in all services listed deployment as the fourth most important 
reason for leaving active duty (DMDC, 2000).4  
                                                 
4 The survey results revealed that junior officers were slightly more likely to leave active duty because 
of deployment, which is one of the reasons for the authors’ research topic. 
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Fricker used the receipt of FSA and IDP to measure deployment indications for 
officers who did not have a deployment indicator in the file.5 He used the same 
deployment measure as Hosek and Totten (Hosek and Totten, 1998) to be comparable to 
them. He wanted to be able to compare officer results with enlisted results. The data were 
drawn from the PERSTEMPO database provided by the DMDC, which covers the period 
from 1990 to 1999.  
He modeled each service separately to account for policy differences across the 
services. He also modeled officers separately in junior grades and middle grades, keeping 
in mind that junior officers may not be fully informed about the military lifestyle when 
making their first retention decision. On the other hand, midgrade officers are fully 
informed; if an officer stays in the military after the MSO, he or she is fully aware of the 
consequences. Secondly, junior officers can leave active duty only at a specific point 
whereas midgrade officers can choose to leave anytime after their MSO expires.  
Fricker utilized logistic regressions for his model. He took into account the 
number of long deployments and the number of episodes of hostile deployments for the 
thirty-six months before the end of each officer’s MSO6. To determine if an officer 
stayed on active duty he looked at one year after the termination of his or her MSO as the 
checkpoint. By allowing one year beyond the officer’s MSO, he took into consideration 
events that increase one’s service obligation. He created subgroups by occupation 
specialty. Beside deployment and specialty subgroups, his model included variables that 
represented gender, race, family status, and whether or not the officer was an academy 
graduate.  
In his study, Fricker compared all four services and junior and midgrade officers. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the authors are interested in Navy and Marine Corps 
junior officers. Figure 1 shows that for the early 1990s, an increasing number of hostile 
                                                 
5 FSA is given to those who are separated from their families for more than thirty days and IDP is 
given to those who are deployed to hostile regions. These definitions will be further explained in Chapter 
III. 
6 The results were similar when the analysis was performed with the length of deployment. 
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deployments were associated with decreasing separation rates. On the other hand, during 
the late 1990s, separation rates increased as the number of hostile deployments increased.  
 
  
Figure 1.   Effects of Deployment on the Likelihood of Separation for Marine Corps 
Officers [From Fricker 2002] 
Figure 2 shows that number of hostile deployments had no practically significant 




Figure 2.   Effects of Deployment on the Likelihood of Separation for Navy Officers 
[From Fricker 2002] 
Fricker divided the entire period into two periods, namely the early 1990s and the 
late 1990s. The early 1990s represented the contraction in the U.S. military, while the late 
1990s represented a more stable period. In the early 1990s, for the Marine Corps the odds 
ratio of separation decreased as the fraction of hostile deployments increased. The effects 
of deployment on retention were not so clear for Navy officers. In the late 1990s, 
increasing episodes of hostile deployments increased the estimated odds ratio of 
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separation for both Navy and Marine Corps officers. The effects of hostile deployment on 
separation rate were much more modest for Navy officers than for Marine Corps officers.  
Fricker modeled occupations separately to find out if specific occupations had 
higher retention rates than others, which would have affected the overall results of the 
model. He utilized separate models for each of the occupations in every service. Despite 
some exceptions, occupational trends were consistent with his general model. These 
results indicated that none of the occupations in the services affected the overall result of 
the models.   
Officers who deployed had lower or neutral odds of separation compared to those 
who did not deploy. The results were similar among deployed officers who deployed to 
hostile regions or nonhostile regions. Fricker found that officers who were deployed to 
either hostile or nonhostile regions stayed on active duty at higher rates than their peers 
who were not deployed. Junior officers deployed to hostile regions stayed on active duty 
at lower rates than those deployed to nonhostile regions, but at higher rates than 
nondeployed junior officers did.  
There were some self-selection issues in the study. Officers who did not like the 
military lifestyle might have already left or preferred positions that did not require 
deployment. It is also possible that officers who preferred the military lifestyle self-
selected positions known to have higher possibilities of deployment. Nondeployed 
officers might have attrited on a larger scale because of increased tempo and stress, 
which would have caused the retention rate of deployed officers to appear higher.  
The study had some limitations, as the author mentions. To be able to evaluate the 
causal effect of deployment and retention, officers would have to be assigned to duties 
randomly, which was not the case. Officers could influence their assignments, which, in 
turn, affected deployment.  
Another limitation was the measure of deployment. To receive FSA, deployment 
had to exceed thirty days. This had two shortcomings: deployments less than thirty days 
were not counted in his study, and two short deployments in a single month or adjacent 
months were counted as one deployment. 
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To summarize, the basic pattern for junior officers was that retention increased as 
the total number of deployments increased. As hostile deployments increased, retention 
rates began to decrease.  
D. HOW DEPLOYMENTS AFFECT SERVICE MEMBERS BY HOSEK, 
KAVANAGH, AND MILLER (2006) 
Hosek, Kavanagh, and Miller prepared this study for the purposes of shedding 
light on the challenges faced by active-duty service members deployed to Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The biggest advantage of the study was that it explained the effects of 
deployment from not only an economic perspective, but also from a sociological and 
psychological perspective. They talked with active-duty service members from all 
services. They also analyzed Status of Forces Surveys of Active Duty Personnel (March 
2003 and July 2003 surveys) conducted by the DMDC from the period of 2003 to early 
2004. The authors aimed to find the effects of recent deployments and recognized that the 
data belonged to the early GWOT period. However, the results and implications are still 
relevant to the current (2009) situation.  
They presented an expected-utility model of deployment and retention. Their 
model assumed that service members did not have any control over their deployment, and 
that deployments were made randomly. The model explained how the probability of 
deployment, expected duration of deployment, randomness of deployment length, base 
pay, and deployment itself affected individual utility. Satisfaction of service members 
while on deployment was dependent on individual and unit preparation, unit cohesion, 
combat conditions, living conditions, duration of deployment, length of duty day, 
communication with family, family support programs, and certainty about deployment. 
Likewise, satisfaction of service members while at home depended on length of duty day, 
participation in family events, family support programs, and quality of housing and 
recreational facilities.  
According to the model, each individual would have a preferred deployment time. 
As the individual’s actual deployment time got closer to the preferred deployment time, 
the individual would experience higher utility. Since some individuals would have less 
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expected deployment time than preferred, higher-than-expected deployment time would 
increase utility for those members. The opposite was also true for individuals who 
experienced less-than-expected deployment with low preferred deployment time.  
The authors conducted focus groups with enlisted personnel and officers in each 
service in the first six months of 2004. There were 324 total respondents: 273 enlisted 
and 51 officers (59 Army personnel, 98 Navy, 71 Marine Corps, and 96 Air Force). The 
goal was to find the correlation between deployment and retention. 
The focus groups reported training for deployment, personal preparation, family 
preparation, increased frequency and length of deployment, long work hours, intense 
work pace on deployment, exposure to danger, coping with the death of colleagues, 
physical and environmental conditions, uncertainty, separation from loved ones, 
reintegration with family, and readjustment to life at home as factors causing stress. The 
stress was relevant for nondeployers, too. They reported increased work pace, separation 
from family because of longer workdays caused by the lack of sufficient and experienced 
personnel, and reintegrating with returning units considering the strong bonds formed 
during deployment as stressors. These factors had different effects on individuals’ 
reenlistment intentions.  
Focus groups also reported pay incentives, the opportunity to use the training in 
real-life situations, reduction in stress by elimination of non-job related issues, duty 
fulfillment, respect shown in public for his or her service, and building strong bonds with 
other members of their unit as positive aspects of the deployment.  
There were some factors called moderators that reduced stress. Training was the 
most significant moderator reported by the focus groups. Talking with friends who 
experienced the same deployment, leadership, family support programs, communication 
with family, counseling, medical care, equipment, exercise, and entertainment (video 




The authors’ analysis of survey responses focused on stress and the intention to 
stay in the military. Stress and retention intention measures were based on self-reports. 
Hosek, Kavanagh, and Miller analyzed the following four intention measures to stay in 
the military: 
• Intention to stay for a career of twenty years or more, 
• Whether desire to stay increased in the last year because of deployment, 
• Whether desire to stay increased in the last year because of being not 
deployed, 
• Whether or not the service member felt that his or her spouse wanted him 
or her to stay in the military. 
For their study, the authors estimated linear probability models (LPMs). The 
variables in their LPM model were the following categorical variables: 
• The number of times in the past twelve months that the service member 
worked longer than the usual duty day 
• Whether the member was away from his or her home station in the past 
twelve months 
• An interaction of ‘away’ with indicators for number of times worked 
longer than usual 
• Whether he or she was involved in combat operation in OEF or OIF 
• Whether being away was longer or shorter than expected 
• Whether the member felt prepared 
• Whether the member felt his or her unit was prepared 
• Rank 
• Marital status 
• Gender 
• Race  
The explanatory variables often had opposite effects on higher-than-usual work 
stress and intention to stay. In other words, if a variable increased higher-than-usual 
stress it also decreased the likelihood of intention to stay. The results for the regressions 
were as follows: 
 17
• Working longer than the usual duty day frequently increased the 
probability of higher-than-usual stress and, therefore, decreased the 
probability of intention to stay. 
• Service members who were away from their home base in the past twelve 
months worked longer than the usual duty day and more frequently than 
those at the home base. This resulted in higher-than-usual-stress and a 
lower intention to stay in the military for both groups. The only difference 
in intention to stay was because of longer work hours deployed personnel 
experienced when compared to personnel at their home base.  
• OEF and OIF had two separate effects, namely on the probability of 
higher-than-usual stress and on intention to stay. Involvement in OEF and 
OIF decreased higher-than-usual stress for airmen only among the enlisted 
community; it decreased Marine Corps officer stress and increased Army 
officer stress among officer corps. These operations decreased the 
intention to stay for Army officers and enlisted personnel.  
• Being away much more than expected increased stress and decreased the 
probability of intention to stay. 
• If the person felt that he or she and his or her unit were well prepared, the 
probability of higher-than-usual stress was lower and the probability of 
intention to stay was higher.  
• Service members experienced lower levels of stress and lower 
performance quality decline when their expectations from the deployment 
were equal to actual situation.  
• Senior personnel, both officers and enlisted, were more likely to stay than 
junior personnel.  
• Being married did not affect stress, but increased the intention to stay. 
Women and white people were more likely to report higher-than-usual 
stress.  
There was a positive association between higher-than-usual stress and intention to 
stay. Members were more likely to stay as higher-than-usual stress increased. The 
authors’ explanation for this relationship was based on the existence of an internal sorting 
process, which allowed personnel with a good match to the military lifestyle to be 
assigned positions that had more deployments.  
There were some differences between officers and enlisted personnel. Firstly, 
individual preparedness and unit preparedness did not significantly reduce stress for 
officers. In addition, working longer than usual duty days was often not significant for the 
intention to stay for officers.   
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Another result worth noting was the categorical variable for the number of times 
in the past twelve months that service member worked longer than the usual duty day was 
not a significant predictor of the intention to stay for those with twenty years or more of 
service. It meant service members who chose the military as a career did not make 
retention decisions based on current work circumstances. Service members who had the 
highest intention to stay in the military were more likely to report a decrease in their 
intention to stay because of deployment and stress. 
The sociological part of the study helped to understand how the increased 
demands of operational tempo caused tension between work and family life and on unit 
cohesion, and how deployments affected morale, leadership, and combat motivation. The 
psychological part of the study helped to understand the relationship between stress and 
performance.  
There were some issues with this study. Retention rates of deployed personnel 
appeared to be normal, but nondeployers had higher attrition rates. Senior personnel were 
more likely to stay in the military regardless of the deployment and stressors because they 
self-selected to stay in the military.  
E. ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION (IA) 
ON ACTIVE COMPONENT NAVY ENLISTED AND OFFICER 
RETENTION BY FRICKER AND BUTTREY (2008) 
Fricker and Buttrey compared service members who had been deployed via 
individual augmentation, or IA (called IAers by the authors), with those who had not 
been on an IA deployment. Enlisted IAers refer to enlisted personnel who have been on 
an IA deployment and made at least one decision to stay or leave the military. Non-IAers 
refer to personnel who either had not ever been on an IA deployment or made a decision 
before the IA deployment. Officer IAers refer to officers who had an IA deployment and 
completed their MSO (all the officer results are cited from Paisant, 2008).  The authors 
chose variable characteristics one year before the decision point, under the premise that 
service members would start to think about their decision sometime prior to their decision 
point.  
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The data set covered all active duty officers and enlisted personnel who had an IA 
deployment since March 2002, which was provided by Pers-4, and administrative records 
from October 1997 through September 2007 obtained from the DMDC. There were 
233,444 total enlisted personnel in the data of who 1,963 had been on an IA deployment, 
and 98,708 officers of whom 4,048 had been on an IA deployment.  
Fricker and Buttrey compared retention rates by aggregate comparisons, 
demographic characteristics, and multivariate models. Aggregate comparisons assessed 
the difference in retention rates by utilizing categories one at a time. According to 
aggregate comparisons, IAers retained at a higher rate by gender, family status, 
race/ethnicity, and pay grade, except for E-4s and E-5s (Non-IAer E-4s and E-5s had 
about one percent higher retention rates), for enlisted personnel. IAer junior officers’ 
retention rates were also higher than non-IAers by gender, family status, race, and rank.  
The same approach was conducted by including all variables in a multivariate 
model to measure the effect of each variable individually. To do this, Fricker and Buttrey 
employed logistic regression for their multivariate analysis. For the enlisted personnel, 
AFQT and education level for quality, pay grade for seniority, decision year for changes 
in economy and gender, family status, and race/ethnicity for demographics were used in 
the model. They ran two separate models; one estimating retention rate of IAers against 
non-IAers, the other for only IAers deployed to hostile regions (Iraq and Afghanistan) 
against all non-IAers. For the first model, they found that IAers had 1.53 higher odds of 
staying than non-IAers. The odds ratio was even higher for Iraq and Afghanistan IAers 
by 1.93 compared to non-IAers. The odds ratio increased from 1.3 in the aggregate 
comparison to 1.53 in the first multivariate model, and it further increased to 1.93 for Iraq 
and Afghanistan IAers.  
Paisant used the same approach for the junior officers in his study. He utilized a 
chi-squared test and a logistic regression, with and without covariates. He included 
gender, race/ethnicity, family status, and warfare specialty variables in his model. Results 
showed that IAers had an odds ratio of 2.57. It was indistinguishable from the 2.56 odds 
ratio in the aggregate comparison.  
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In conclusion, the studies found that IAers had higher retention rates, contrary to 
the general view, for both officers and enlisted personnel. The only exception was the 
lower rates seen in E-4s and E-5s, which were practically insignificant.  
Some issues must be kept in mind when assessing the results, as the researchers 
pointed out. IA has been conducted for the past six years. The research analyzed retention 
behavior of 2002 cohort, whose retention decision was the only observed one. The study 
should be updated, as more recent data become available about retention behavior of 
other cohorts. Operational tempo has varied too much since the beginning of GWOT. 
Results may not reflect the most recent situation. Researchers were not able to recognize 
volunteer IAers’ high retention rates, which may be concealing lower retention rates for 
nonvolunteers.  Due to self-selection, a causal relationship between IA deployment and 
rise in retention rates cannot be inferred. In addition, retention rates could have been 




A. DATA SOURCE 
The file used in this study was the Active Duty Personnel Cohort file that was 
obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). It was mainly built from 
Active Duty Personnel Extract files, covering the period from December 1987 to 
September 2007. The DMDC provided information from the Active Duty Personnel file, 
the Active Duty Military Pay file, and the Desert Storm file, and these files were merged 
by social security numbers (SSNs). To avoid the official limitations (approval and time 
limitation) of using SSNs, we received a file arranged according to a specific 
identification number for each individual rather than by SSN. Some members had 
multiple entries that indicate breaks of their military service. The data set contained 
information on service, MOS, gender, education, race and ethnicity, active duty date, 
source of commission, marital status, and Desert Storm Operation deployment status. It 
also contained extracted data elements like family status, pay grade, occupation group, 
duty location, and a hostile/nonhostile deployment indicator. The Marine Corps file 
contained 39,339 records and the Navy file contained 129,692 records. The file consisted 
of information on active duty officers on a quarterly basis from 1993 to 2007. We utilized 
this information to determine the effects of characteristics of junior officers along with 
the deployments for the GWOT on their retention decisions.  
The study defines retention based on observing each officer one year beyond the 
MSO (minimum service obligation) for each cohort. MSO is five years for USNA 
graduate officers, except for aviators and nuclear officers who have 7-8 years of MSO. 
This research will include possible extensions due to postgraduate education and/or 
training during the MSO. Thus, if an officer graduated in 1998, our threshold for his or 
her stay-or-leave decision will be 2004, one year after the end of the five-year obligation. 
Unlike enlisted personnel, officers make stay/leave decisions each year for the 
rest of their career. If we intended to look at a five-year threshold, we would include 
some officers who had an extended service obligation as being “retained.” However, that 
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may not be the case. As displayed in Figure 3, by looking at a 6-year window we allow 
extended service obligations to be included and prevent overstating retention. 
 
Minimum Service Obligation  MSO+1 year 
Years of Service
5 years  6 years
(1990-2001) Check point for retention
Graduation year
 
Figure 3.   Explanation of 6-year Period to Determine Whether an Officer Stayed in 
Military 
The data consisted of 129,692 longitudinal records of Navy officers and 39,339 
Marines Corps officers at the beginning as shown in Table 1. Midgrade officers and 
officers other than U.S. Naval Academy graduates are not within the scope of this thesis. 
Moreover, the data covered the period until 2007. The retention point for this study is six 
years. We are not able to observe the decision of officers who graduated after 2002. After 
deleting these observations, there were 9,623 officers in the Navy file and 1,690 in the 
Marine Corps file. The retention variable was created based on having information at the 
second quarter of the sixth year. If the observation did not have information on his or her 
sixth year, it was accepted as attrited and coded “0”. Some of the observations had no 
information from the beginning of their commissioning date for some reason. These 
observations would have overstated retention in our model. Thus, we looked through all 
records in the file and deleted observations that did not have any information for two and 
a half years from the commissioning date (because of inadequate information). Aviators 
and submarine officers are also out of scope of this study because of their longer MSOs. 
Removing them from the study left 6,894 observations in the Navy data and 1,005 
observations in the Marine Corps data for analysis. 
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 Navy Marine Corps 
Original data 129,692 39,339 
Delete non-academy grads 106,131 35,203 
Delete <1990 & >2001 13,938 2,446 
Remaining 9,623 1,690 
Inadequate information 226 72 
Aviators 2,132 613 
Submarine 371 0 
Final numbers 6,894 1,005 
Table 1.   Explanation of Observation Numbers in Data Files 
B. DATA RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Nuclear officers, flight officers, and pilots undergo longer training periods and 
have longer MSOs than other officers have. Therefore, they are excluded in this study. 
Officers who are assigned to other services are not included due to difficulty in tracking 
them and obtaining their information. 
Hostile deployment is determined by looking at deployments to Iraq and 
Afghanistan. However, not all the officers who deploy to these regions are exposed to 
danger. Front line officers are exposed to more life-threatening situations, but the data do 
not capture this information.  
In the Navy data file, there was no indication of deployments to Iraq or 
Afghanistan, which led us to analyze all Navy deployments as general. We could not 
classify any deployment as hostile for the post-GWOT period. We had planned to divide 
the data into four categories: two for periods and two for deployment types. This 
drawback hampered our analysis of the effect of the GWOT on USNA graduates in the 
way we had intended. 
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Our threshold for the beginning of the GWOT period is the end of 2001. Cohorts 
from 1990 to 1995 are included in the pre-GWOT period, while cohorts from 1996 to 
2001 are included in the post-GWOT period. 
Reasons for leaving the military include voluntary separation, discharge, medical, 
and injury/death. We were not given specific information on separation date and reason. 
For a particular observation, if the officer did not have any information for ten 
consecutive quarters, we assumed that he or she had left the military.  
While cleaning the data, we accepted the end of the data as the end of 
deployment. That is, if an officer was deployed in the second quarter of 2007 and 
returned in the second quarter of 2008, we calculated that specific deployment as six 
months, rather than a year.  
Family status was categorized as joint marriage, married, single with family, or 
single without family. Considering previous studies, having dependents is a strong 
explanatory variable that affects stay/leave decisions. However, current available data 
provided information on marital status, but not the number of dependents. A married 
service member with five children was treated the same as with a married service 
member who has no children.  
Deployment information was on a quarterly basis. It reflected the deployment 
status of an officer at the exact point when the information was recorded. An officer, who 
was in his or her deployment location at the time the data were recorded, would appear to 
have three months as deployment duration even if he or she was deployed for only one 
month. The opposite is also true. An officer who came back from deployment would not 
have that information if he or she happened to return before the data were recorded. 
Another weakness of the data was missing values for MOS for the Marine Corps 
and designator for the Navy. Billet codes were used for these missing values to categorize 
military occupational specialties. Moreover, almost one-third of the observations had 
neither designator codes nor billet codes. These officers were placed into other MOS 
category along with the observations whose billet codes did not belong to any specific 
group.  
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As shown in Figure 4, the number of Navy observations in the 1990, 1991, and 
1992 cohorts were higher than in the rest of the cohorts. As explained in Table 1, aviators 
and submarine officers were excluded from this study. In Table 2, this problem is 
explained in detail. Starting from 1993, designator information was more accurate, and 
information for submarine officers and aviators was more reasonable. However, in 1990, 
1991, and 1992 a lot of the designator information was missing. Under our rule, those 
missing observations were classified as “other MOS” rather than aviator and submarine, 
and therefore remained in the data. Whereas, aviator numbers averaged 230 per year after 
1993, they averaged eighteen per year before 1993. If we would have had better data, we 
could have classified aviators and submarine officers correctly and deleted them. These 




90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 
SWO 45 92 73 165 198 167 170 162 155 163 154 188 
Supply 28 34 22 55 47 54 38 87 88 70 97 71 
Other MOS 744 667 719 331 297 272 250 245 234 251 238 223 
Submarine 23 20 8 44 27 29 27 23 32 42 45 51 
Aviator 20 13 22 245 167 246 266 247 238 201 243 224 
Table 2.   Naval Officers’ Designator Distribution by Cohorts 
C. ASSUMPTIONS  
Prior enlistment was decided based on the difference between the pay entry base 
date and date of entry to officer ranks. Observations that had pay information in the data 
before entering the Naval Academy were considered as prior enlisted. If the difference 
was more than 48 months, the officer was assumed to be prior enlisted. If an officer did 
not have any information for ten consecutive quarters, he or she was considered to have 
left the military.  
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D. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
Figure 4 displays the number of Naval Academy graduates in our data by 
graduation year. There were 6,894 observations in the Navy file and 1,005 observations 
in the Marine Corps file after deleting aviators and submarine officers. Approximately 
15% of each cohort selected the Marine Corps each year on average. Fluctuations were 
caused by designators and data error as explained in the section on data limitations. The 
distribution was more homogenous before deleting aviators. For instance, the 1993 cohort 
had 67 Marine Corps officers, but 60 of them were aviators.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Number of USNA Graduates by Service and Cohorts 
As presented in Table 3 and Table 4, the majority of the officers in both services 
were white single males. The percentage of female officers increased by six percentage 
points for the Navy, from 10% to 16%, and by ten percentage points for the Marine 
Corps, from 4% to 14%. Approximately half of the officers were single and without 
dependents; officers in the other half either were married or had dependents or both. The 
proportion of married officers decreased by 8% for the Navy and by 10% for the Marine 
Corps after the GWOT. One can surmise that there was reluctance among officers to get 
married due to the lack of time to establish a stable relationship or because of high life-
threatening deployments they may experience. There was a rise in the percentage of 
service members who married another service member between the two periods for both 
services. 
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Naval officers had a general deployment rate of 15% in the pre-GWOT period 
and 18% in post-GWOT period.7 Of the deployed naval officers, most of them were 
deployed only once. As to deployment duration, the majority of naval officers 
experienced deployments longer than a year regardless of the period. Being away from 
home and loved ones for such long periods might affect service members more, 
compared to going on two relatively short deployments. Although the Marines deployed 
more frequently, their deployment durations were concentrated in deployments of less 
than six months. While the Navy sent officers for fewer but longer deployments, the 
Marine Corps sent officers on more frequent but shorter deployments. No significant 
increase in deployments one year prior to the service member’s decision to stay or leave 
the military was detected for either service.  
Prior enlistment is included in the models as a separate variable by which to 
predict retention behavior of service members more accurately. Being aware of the 
military lifestyle and choosing this as a career, prior enlisted personnel are expected to 
retain at a higher rate than their peers do. The preliminary results indicated that there was 
almost no change in the proportion of prior enlisted in the post-GWOT period.  
A significant change was observed in the ratio of military occupational 
specialties. The percentage of surface warfare officers and supply officers almost doubled 
in the Navy in the post-GWOT period.  
The 1990, 1991, and 1992, Navy cohorts had data errors, which created a 
fluctuation in designators as presented in Table 2. Readers might think this error has the 
potential to bias the results. Therefore, to prevent the possibility of misinterpretation 
separate results were produced for the pre-GWOT Navy cohorts omitting the 1990-1992 
cohorts. The results were similar for most of the variables, though. The proportion of 
observations in each designator changed drastically. As Table 3 shows, while the 
percentage of SWO and supply officers almost doubled, the number of officers in the 
“other MOS” (designator) category decreased by half. The ratio of officers experiencing  
 
                                                 
7 We mention general deployments to compare two services. The Navy file did not have any hostile 
deployment information.  
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a deployment rose from almost 15% to 20%. Figures for deployment frequency and 
duration did not change, despite an increase of five-percentage point increase in the 




N = 4,010 
(1990-1995 cohorts) 
Pre-GWOT 




N = 2,884 
Pooled 
Sample 
N = 6,894 
Gender (%)     
Male*** 89.28 87.33 83.32 86.79 
Female*** 10.72 12.67 16.68 13.21 
Race/Ethnicity (%)     
White*** 83.04 78.81 73.40 79.01 
Black 5.34 6.68 6.21 5.70 
Hispanic*** 4.86 6.24 12.14 7.91 
Other Race** 6.64 8.27 8.25 7.38 
Marital Status (%)     
Joint Marriage*** 1.21 1.22 3.69 2.24 
Married*** 48.99 44.91 41.10 45.69 
Single with Family*** 1.59 3.20 3.90 2.55 
Single without Family** 48.21 50.67 51.32 49.51 
Age     
Average Age*** 28.67 28.77 28.78 28.71 
Prior Enlistment (%)     




N = 4,010 
(1990-1995 cohorts) 
Pre-GWOT 




N = 2,884 
Pooled 
Sample 
N = 6,894 
Military Occupational 
Specialty (%) 
    
Surface Warfare 
Officer*** 
18.45 33.42 34.40 25.12 
Supply*** 5.99 9.84 15.64 10.02 
Other MOS*** 75.56 56.75 49.97 64.85 
Being Deployed in Last 12 Months Prior to Stay Decision (%) 
Last12 6.83 6.68 7.14 6.96 
General Deployment 
Indicator (%) 
    
No Deployment*** 85.36 80.96 81.66 83.81 
General Deployment*** 14.64 19.04 18.34 16.19 
General Deployment Frequency Indicator (%) 
No Deployment***   85.36 80.96 81.66 83.81 
One General 
Deployment*** 
13.02 16.65 15.78 14.17 
Two or More General 
Deployments*** 
1.62 2.40 2.57 2.02 
General Deployment Duration Indicator (%) 
No Deployment***   85.36 80.96 81.66 83.81 
General Deployments < 
6 Months 
1.87 2.77 1.77 1.83 




N = 4,010 
(1990-1995 cohorts) 
Pre-GWOT 




N = 2,884 
Pooled 
Sample 
N = 6,894 
& <12 Months 
General Deployments 
>12 Months***  
9.85 12.86 14.11 11.63 
*** Chi2 statistic significant at .01 level 
**   Chi2 statistic significant at .05 level 
*     Chi2 statistic significant at .10 level 
Table 3.   Characteristics of Naval Officers Eligible to Make Retention Decision 
As shown in Table 4, for the Marine Corps, the difference between combat and 
combat support changed by 8% in the favor of combat support in the post-GWOT period, 
while the number of combatants decreased by seven percentage points and the number of 
officers in combat support units increased by the same percentage in the Marine Corps.  
There was a huge gap between Navy and Marine Corps service members’ 
deployment rates. Marine Corps service members had 70% and 55% general deployment 
rates in the pre- and post-GWOT period, respectively, compared to naval officers’ 15% 
and 18% general deployment rates. 
The proportion of Marine officers experiencing more than one deployment was 
considerably higher than for Navy officers. Approximately 30% of the officers deployed 
two or more times in the pre-GWOT period and 20% of the officers deployed two or 
more times in the post-GWOT period. The ratio of hostile deployed officers was almost 
11% for all the officers and it increased to 18% among deployed officers in the Marine 
Corps. 
In this study, hostile deployment was defined only for the GWOT-period 
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. There were no member locations coded as Iraq and 
Afghanistan in the Navy file. Therefore, the Navy did not have a hostile deployment 
indicator in this data. Figures showed that around 20% of the Marine officers experienced 
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hostile deployments. Of these officers, more than 80% were deployed only once and the 
remaining experienced two or more deployments. The number of hostile deployments 




N = 424 
Post-GWOT 




Gender (%)    
Male*** 95.05 85.54 89.55 
Female*** 4.95 14.46 10.45 
Race/Ethnicity (%)    
White 81.84 80.72 81.19 
Black 8.25 7.92 8.06 
Hispanic 7.08 5.34 6.07 
Other Race** 2.83 6.02 4.68 
Marital Status (%)    
Joint Marriage*** 3.09 7.09 5.41 
Married*** 46.32 36.68 40.74 
Single with Family 1.43 .69 1.00 
Single without Family** 49.17 55.54 52.85 
Age     
Average Age*** 29.26 28.78 28.98 
Prior Enlistment (%)    
Prior Enlisted 2.36 2.75 2.59 




N = 424 
Post-GWOT 




Combat ** 52.02 44.29 47.55 
Combat Support ** 47.98 55.71 52.45 
Being Deployed in Last 12 Months Prior to Stay Decision 
Last12* 8.96 12.39 10.95 
General Deployment Indicator (%)    
General Deployments*** 71.46 54.91 61.89 
No Deployment*** 28.54 45.09 38.11 
Deployment Frequency Indicators (%)    
No Deployment***   28.54 45.09 38.11 
One General Deployment* 41.75 36.32 38.61 
Two or More General Deployments*** 29.72 18.59 23.28 
Deployment Duration Indicators (%)    
No Deployment***   28.54 45.09 38.11 
General Deployments < 6 Months*** 32.08 23.92 27.36 
General Deployments >6 & <12 Months***  20.28 13.08 16.12 
General Deployments >12 Months  19.10 17.90 18.41 
Hostile Deployment Indicator (%)    
No Hostile Deployment - 80.72 - 
Hostile Deployment(s)  - 19.28 - 
Hostile Deployment Frequency Indicators (%)    
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Post-GWOT 




One Hostile Deployment  - 16.35 - 
Two or More Hostile Deployment - 2.93 - 
Hostile Deployment Duration Indicators (%)    
No Hostile Deployment - 80.72 - 
Hostile Deployments Less Than 6 Months  - 13.25 - 
Hostile Deployments More Than 6 Months  - 6.02 - 
*** Chi2 statistic significant at .01 level 
**   Chi2 statistic significant at .05 level 
*     Chi2 statistic significant at .10 level 
Table 4.   Characteristics of Marine Corps Officers Eligible to Make Retention Decision 
As stated in the previous studies, marital status was a key factor in the decision to 
stay or leave. Being single has mostly been associated with lower retention. Quester 
(2006) found in her study that single officers had higher deployment frequencies. 
However, we calculated almost an equal rate of general deployment for these two 
categories. The general deployment rate for married officers was 60% versus 64% for 
single officers. Tabulations of data in hand also showed that single officers without 
dependents were deployed longer than married officers. This gap increased as the 
duration of hostile deployments increased.  
Figure 5 and Table 5 display the retention rates by marital status and by service. 
The highest rate of leaving at the initial decision point belonged to single officers while 
married officers and those with dependents had significantly higher retention rates. Single 




enjoy the stable benefits offered by the military. Naval officers apparently have had 
higher retention rates across all categories of marital status throughout the whole period 
covered in the study.  
 
 
Figure 5.   Retention Percentages by Marital Status by Service 
 
Joint Marriage Married Single with Family 
Single without 
Family  
Navy USMC Navy USMC Navy USMC Navy USMC
Attrited 16 12 608 92 36 4 1,550 273 
Retained 137 42 2,507 315 138 6 1,825 255 
Table 5.   Retention Numbers by Marital Status by Service 
Figure 6 shows that retention rates for both services follow the same pattern 
across cohorts. However, naval officers always have higher retention rates (except for the 




Figure 6.   Retention Rates by Services  
1. Deployment Frequency Analysis 
Figure 7 shows that an increase in the number of deployments contributes to 
higher retention rates before the GWOT. The more deployments a naval officer 
experiences the more likely he or she prefers to stay in the military. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Pre-GWOT Navy General Deployment Retention Rates 
The same pattern is valid for the Marine Corps as well, as seen in Figure 8. An 
increasing number of deployments contributed to higher retention rates. More than half of 
the nondeployed officers preferred to leave the military. We believe this probably stems 
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from unsatisfied expectations about the military lifestyle. As these officers had the 




Figure 8.   Pre-GWOT Marine Corps General Deployment Retention Rates 
Not surprisingly, nondeployed officers had a lower tendency to stay in the 
military compared to their deployed peers, as found in the previous literature. As shown 
in Figure 9, an increasing number of deployments helped to increase retention, more than 
in the pre-GWOT period. Compared to the pre-GWOT’s four-percentage point increase 
from a 61% to a 65% retention rate, officers deployed at least once in the post-GWOT 
cohorts had a nine percentage point increase, from 71% to 80%.  
 
 
Figure 9.   Post-GWOT Navy Retention Rates 
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Figure 10 shows that the positive effect of deployment increased after the GWOT 
for the Marine Corps. The effect increases drastically when we look at only hostile 
deployments. One can see an upward trend in retention rates with an increasing number 
of deployments. Officers who are willing to select the Marine Corps expect to have more 
deployments than their peers do. Therefore, their actual utility will be closer to their 
expected utility as they experience more deployments. Having fewer non-job related 
duties and more opportunities to apply leadership skills, as well as using training in real-
life situations, may explain their higher retention during the post-GWOT period. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Post-GWOT Marine Corps Retention Rates 
2. Deployment Duration Analysis 
According to the retention rate tabulations by deployment duration in Figure 11, 
the highest retention rates belonged to naval officers who were deployed less than six 
months and more than twelve months, respectively. It is odd to see a lower retention rate 
for officers who were deployed between six and twelve months than for nondeployed 




Figure 11.   Pre-GWOT Navy Retention Rates by General Deployment Duration 
Figure 12 shows that there is an obvious upward trend for pre-GWOT Marine 
Corps officers’ retention by deployment duration. The longer a marine is deployed, the 
more likely he or she would prefer to continue military service. Marine Corps officers 
react more positively to longer deployments than their naval colleagues do.  
 
 
Figure 12.   Pre-GWOT Marine Corps Retention Rates by General Deployment Duration 
Figure 13 shows that, contrary to the pre-GWOT period, officers stayed in the 
military at higher rates in the post-GWOT period, regardless of the length of deployment. 
Whether because of the effect of psychological aspects like patriotism and nationalism or 
physical ones like better pecuniary benefits, retention rates among junior officers in the 
Navy were obviously higher than in the previous period as a whole. The highest retention 
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rate emerged for officers who were deployed less than six months, as in the pre-GWOT 
period. Another conspicuous trend is the decreasing retention rate with extended tours, as 
shown in Figure 13.  
 
 
Figure 13.   Post-GWOT Navy Retention Rates by General Deployment Duration 
In Figure 14, it appears that continuation rates increase with deployment duration. 
However, we believe that it is the effect of deployment itself, rather than its length, that 
affects continuation. The effect of duration on retention is almost the same for post-
GWOT Marine Corps junior officers. Figure 14 shows retention rates for any of the 
periodical categories were significantly higher for deployed than for nondeployed 
officers. Moreover, when compared to the pre-GWOT period, we witness on average a 
13% higher continuation rate.  
 
 
Figure 14.   Post-GWOT Marine Corps Retention Rates by General Deployment and 
Duration 
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Figure 15 shows that hostile deployment contributes to a higher retention rate, but 
to a lesser degree than general deployments do. The continuation rate was substantially 
increased by longer deployments for officers deployed to hostile regions. The six 
percentage point increase in continuation rates can be attributed to being deployed rather 
than the duration. however, the eleven percentage point difference between deployments 




Figure 15.   Post-GWOT Marine Corps Retention Rates by Hostile Deployment and 
Duration 
Table 6 presents the average deployment duration in months. The GWOT did not 
affect the duration of deployments for either services. Naval officers deploy longer on 
average than Marine officers. This might be a result of the two-year sea/shore rotation 
policy executed by the Navy. For the Marines, half of the deployments after the GWOT 
are hostile.  
 
General Deployments Hostile Deployments 
Pre-GWOT Post-GWOT 
Navy Marine Corps Navy Marine Corps 
Navy Marine Corps 
20.89 12.09 21.22 12.66 - 6.70 
Table 6.   Average Deployment Duration by Deployment Type, Service, and Period 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
A. ANALYTICAL METHOD 
1. Theoretical Model 
We wanted to analyze the individual decisions of eligible junior officers to stay or 
leave active duty. Therefore, logistic regression was preferred because retention is 
measured as a binary outcome. We defined the dependent variable for every observation 
(i) as Yi, which was coded 1 if the officer decided to stay, and 0 otherwise.  
The theoretical model is: 
log ( Pi / (1-Pi) ) = β0 + β1X1 + .. + βnXn  
where : 
log ( pi / (1-pi) ) = Log of odds ratio for individual i 
pi = Probability of stay for individual i 
β0 = Intercept 
β = Estimated coefficient (change in log odds for a unit change in Xs) 
X = Values of explanatory variables 
2. Model Specification  
a. General Deployment Model 
The purpose of this model was to capture the effect of being deployed 
(regardless of type of deployment) or not being deployed. An interaction of the GWOT 
dummy with being deployed was included to reflect the treatment effect.  
Thus, the model is as follows: 
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ln( Pi / (1-Pi) ) = β0 + β1FEMALE + β2BLACK + β3HISPANIC + 
β4OTHERRACE + β5JOINTMARRIAGE + 
β6SINGLEWITHFAM + β7SINGLEWOFAM + β8AGE + 
β9PRIORENLISTED + β10SWO + β11SUP + β12LAST12 + 
β13GENDEP + β14GWOT + β15GENDEP_GWOT  
where: 
FEMALE = being female 
BLACK = being African American 
HISPANIC = being Hispanic 
OTHERRACE = being other race except white, black, or Hispanic 
JOINTMARRIAGE = being married with a spouse who is also in 
the military 
SINGLEWITHFAM = being single with dependent(s) 
SINGLEWOFAM = being single with no dependent 
AGE = age of the officer 
PRIORENLISTED = being enlisted prior to USNA 
SWO8 = being a surface warfare officer (SWO) 
SUP= being a supply officer 
LAST12 = being deployed in the last twelve months prior to the 
end of a MSO 
GENDEP = being deployed either to a hostile or nonhostile region 
GWOT = period after 9/11 (2001) 





                                                 
8  SWO and SUP are MOS variables for Navy models. COMBAT and COMBATSUPPORT replace 
these variables for the Marine Corps models. 
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b. General Deployment Frequency Model 
This model captured the effect of the number of deployments of any type. 
The model is stated as follows: 
ln( Pi / (1-Pi) ) = β0 + β1FEMALE + β2BLACK + β3HISPANIC + 
β4OTHERRACE + β5JOINTMARRIAGE + 
β6SINGLEWITHFAM + β7SINGLEWOFAM + β8AGE + 
β9PRIORENLISTED + β10SWO + β11SUP + β12LAST12 
β13ONEGENDEP + β14TWOMOREGENDEP + β15GWOT + 
β16ONEGENDEP_GWOT + β172MOREGENDEP_GWOT  
where: 
ONEGENDEP = being deployed only once 
2MORE_DEP = being deployed two or more times 
ONEGENDEP_GWOT = the effect of treatment (GWOT) for one 
deployment 
TWOMOREGENDEP_GWOT = the effect of treatment (GWOT) 
for two or more deployments 
c. General Deployment Duration Model 
This model captured the effect of the duration of deployments, regardless 
of deployment type. It is stated as such: 
ln( Pi / (1-Pi) ) = β0 + β1FEMALE + β2BLACK + β3HISPANIC + 
β4OTHERRACE + β5JOINTMARRIAGE + 
β6SINGLEWTITHFAM + β7SINGLEWOFAM + β8AGE + 
β9PRIORENLISTED + β10SWO + β11SUP + β12LAST12 + 
β13DEPLESS_6 + β14DEP6_12 + β15DEPMORE_12 +  β16GWOT 
+ β17DEPLESS_6_GWOT + β18DEP6_12_GWOT + 





DEPLESS_6 = being deployed for six months or shorter 
DEP6_12 = being deployed between seven and twelve months 
DEPMORE_12 = being deployed for longer than twelve months 
DEPLESS_6_ GWOT = the effect of treatment (GWOT) for 
deployments shorter than six months 
DEP6_12_ GWOT = the effect of treatment (GWOT) for 
deployments between seven and twelve months 
DEPMORE_12_ GWOT = the effect of treatment (GWOT) for 
deployments longer than twelve months 
d. Hostile Deployment Model 
This model captured the effect of hostile deployments versus nonhostile 
deployments. We did not include an interaction term between hostile deployments and 
GWOT, because all deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan after the GWOT were 
considered as hostile in our model. The model is as follows: 
ln( Pi / (1-Pi) ) = β0 + β1FEMALE + β2BLACK + β3HISPANIC + 
β4OTHERRACE + β5JOINTMARRIAGE + 
β6SINGLEWITHFAM + β7SINGLEWOHFAM + β8AGE + 
β9PRIORENLISTED + β10COMBAT + β11LAST12 + β12HOSDEP 
+ β13GWOT  
where: 







e. Hostile Deployment Frequency Model 
This model captured the effect of the number of hostile deployments. The 
model is as follows: 
ln( Pi / (1-Pi) ) = β0 + β1FEMALE + β2BLACK + β3HISPANIC + 
β4OTHERRACE + β5JOINTMARRIAGE + 
β6SINGLEWITHFAM + β7SINGLEWOFAM + β8AGE + 
β9PRIORENLISTED + β10COMBAT + β11LAST12 + 
β12ONEHOSDEP + β13TWOMOREHOSDEP + β14GWOT  
where: 
ONEHOSDEP = being deployed to hostile region once 
TWOMOREHOSDEP = being deployed to hostile region two or 
more times  
f. Hostile Deployment Duration Model 
This model captured the effect of duration of hostile deployments and is 
stated as follows: 
ln( Pi / (1-Pi) ) = β0 + β1FEMALE + β2BLACK + β3HISPANIC + 
β4OTHERRACE + β5JOINTMARRIAGE + 
β6SINGLEWTITHFAM + β7SINGLEWOFAM + β8AGE + 
β9PRIORENLISTED + β10COMBAT + β11LAST12 + 
β12HOSDEPLESS_6 + β13HOSDEPMORE_6 +  β14GWOT   
where: 
HOSDEPLESS_6 = being deployed to hostile region for six 
months or shorter 
HOSDEPMORE_6 = being deployed to hostile region more than 
six months 
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B. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
1. Dependent Variable (RETAINED) 
A binary variable was used to capture the decision of retention. If an officer 
decided to stay in the military at the end of his or her MSO, this variable was given the 
value of 1 and the officer classified as “retained.” In this study, we accepted an officer as 
retained if he or she had any information in the sixth year, as explained in detail in 
Chapter III. If no information was detected beyond his or her MSO, he or she was 
classified as attrited and this variable was given a value of 0.  
2. Explanatory Variables 
a. Demographic Variables 
(1) Gender (MALE, FEMALE): The gender variable was 
binary and took the value of 1 for female officers and 0 for male officers. The base case 
was male officers, who make up the majority for both services. The burden of the family 
is mainly on females. With increasing operational tempo and longer deployment 
durations, every service member is affected in a negative manner, but females perhaps 
more. In the case of deciding between family and military, female service members are 
expected to be more inclined to choose family. Therefore, the expected sign of the 
FEMALE variable is negative.  
(2) Race/Ethnicity (WHITE, BLACK, HISPANIC, 
OTHERRACE): Race/Ethnicity was categorized in four separate variables: white, black, 
Hispanic, and other race. Each of them was binary and took a value of 1 if an observation 
belonged to that specific group, and 0 otherwise. The base case was white, which makes 
up the majority in both services again. If non-white officers believe they have a level of 
opportunity equal to white officers in the military, or better opportunities than in civilian 
life to promote and have a career, they become more likely to stay. Stewart and Firestone 
(1992) concluded in their study that there is a white male dominance in the military. All 
of the services have programs to boost minority accessions and ensure minority officers 
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have a chance to succeed and be promoted in the military. It would be reasonable to 
expect minorities to stay in the military at a higher rate than their white peers. The 
expected sign for race/ethnicity for each group, other than white, is positive.  
(3) Family status (JOINTMARRIAGE, MARRIED, 
SINGLEWITHFAM, SINGLEWOFAM): Family status was categorized into several 
variables: (1) joint marriage for couples who are both service members; (2) single with 
family for single service members with children; (3) single without family for service 
members who are single and have no dependents, and (4) married for married service 
members (regardless of number of children). The base case was married for this variable. 
Service members with dependents, whether married or single, are expected to have higher 
retention rates than others. Increasing frequency and duration of deployments and the 
uncertainty of acquiring a satisfactory civilian job might have a negative retention effect 
for every family status category. Single service members are expected to leave military 
more readily than their peers who are married and/or have children. Single service 
members without family are expected to have a negative coefficient of retention, and all 
other marital statuses are expected to have positive ones.  
(4) Age (AGE): We calculated age at the time of the decision 
to stay or leave. It was computed by adding six years to the date of commissioning and 
subtracting the date of birth. The older the service member, the more likely he or she is to 
be married and have dependents, and the more eager to have a reliable income and health 
benefits.  
b. Service Variables 
(1) Prior enlisted (PRIORENLISTED): An officer was 
categorized as prior enlisted if he had pay entry information prior to entrance to USNA. 
Prior enlistment is expected to have a positive effect on service members’ retention 
decisions for two reasons. Service members who were prior enlisted have acquired 
knowledge about military life and might prefer to stay in the military as a career officer. 
Secondly, they are more likely to stay in the military for retirement versus their younger 
colleagues. 
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(2) Military occupational specialty/designator (MOS): For the 
Navy, officers were grouped into the following categories: surface warfare, supply and 
other. Of the 6,894 officers, 2,109 did not have any MOS information and were placed 
into the “other MOS” category. Officers who had neither a designator nor a specific billet 
code were classified into “other MOS” as well. The Marine Corps had two categories for 
MOS: combat and combat support. A few missing values were ignored. We expect 
different effects for officers who fight in the front lines versus those who support them or 
who are in support jobs.  
c. Deployment Variables 
Officers commissioned after 9/11 might be expected to have different 
views on deployments and military life, taking into account effects such as patriotism, 
nationalism, and the threat to the U.S. The terror attacks on the World Trade Center 
might have caused every officer to volunteer for deployments to defeat terrorists, even 
though they joined the military before 9/11 and were unaware of this threat. The different 
aspect of officers commissioned after 9/11 is that their expectation from deployments 
might have changed drastically after the attack. It would be more interesting to analyze 
the data of officers who joined the USNA after 2001. It is reasonable to think hostile 
deployments will have positive effects on the retention decision of these officers. This 
might be a possible new research topic. All deployment information in this study covered 
a period of six years for every officer. Having already made his or her decision to stay in 
the military or leave, deployments after six years were not included, in order not to 
overestimate the effect of deployments. 
(1) Deployment status (GENDEP, HOSDEP): These were 
binary variables. The deployed variable (GENDEP) took the value of 1 for officers who 
experienced a general deployment, and the hostile deployment (HOSDEP) variable took 
the value of 1 for officers who experienced a hostile deployment at least once. The 
expected sign of the deployment status depends on the expectation of each individual. 
Every officer’s expected utility differs from all the others in terms of deployment 
duration and frequency as they are first commissioned. If the actual figures exceed 
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expectations in a negative manner (longer for officers who prefer none or shorter 
deployments and shorter or no deployment for those who prefer longer and more 
deployments), they may tend to leave the military at a higher rate than their peers do. 
Deployment will have a positive effect on retention as expected utility gets closer to the 
actual. Nondeployed service members, and only those deployed only to nonhostile 
regions, form the base case. 
(2) Deployment frequency (GENDEPCOUNT, 
HOSDEPCOUNT): These were continuous variables ranging from 0 to 3 for the Navy, 
and 0 to 4 for the Marines. These indicated the total number of general deployments 
(GENDEPCOUNT) and total number of hostile deployments (HOSDEPCOUNT) 
separately. These variables were divided into subgroups as ONEGENDEP for service 
members with one deployment and TWOMOREGENDEP for those with two or more 
deployments. The base case is again nondeployed or nonhostile-deployed officers. The 
expected sign of this variable depends on the expected utility, as explained above. We 
expect a positive correlation between the dependent variable (RETAINED) and 
frequency variables if an officer experiences what he or she expected in terms of the 
deployment frequency of either type of deployment.  
(3) Deployment duration (GENDEPDUR, HOSDEPDUR): In 
this study, three variables were generated to capture the effect of general deployment 
duration and two variables for hostile deployments. We believe deployment durations 
have some threshold values for service members. Therefore, for general deployments, we 
defined a “short tour” as one less than six months (DEPLESS_6), a “medium tour” as one 
between six and twelve months (DEP6_12), and a “long tour” as one lasting more than a 
year (DEPMORE_12). For hostile deployments, categories were created for less than six 
months (HOSDEPLESS_6) and for more than six months (HOSDEPMORE_6). The base 
case was nondeployed and nonhostile-deployed officers. The general belief is that the 
longer the deployment, the greater the negative effect on service members’ retention 




on Navy junior officers (2001), deployments had a positive or neutral effect on retention 
despite the general belief. Nevertheless, fighting in the front lines might decrease the 
positive effect of deployments for USMC junior officers.  
(4) Being deployed in the last twelve months prior to 
stay/leave decision (LAST12): This was a binary variable. If the service member was 
deployed in the last twelve months prior to his or her retention decision, either hostile or 
nonhostile, the variable took the value of 1, and 0 otherwise. We assumed that most 
officers make their decision one year prior to the end of their MSO. We believe this 
deployment might have the largest effect among the deployments. The opposite is also 
possible. Being in the continental U.S. (being nondeployed) might have a major effect on 
service members’ decision as well.  
(5) Treatment effect (GWOT): In this study, we used the 
GWOT variable to capture the effect of the Global War on Terror on retention. It was a 
binary variable and extracted from the date of commissioning variable. It took the value 
of 1 for officers who graduated between 1996 and 2001, and who thus made retention 
decisions after the declaration of the GWOT, and the value of 0 for those who graduated 
between 1990 and 1995, with their decisions made prior to the attacks.  
(6) Interaction terms: We assumed that various type, duration, 
and frequency categories of deployment used in this study would have different effects 
on retention. For instance, being deployed more than a year, before or after the GWOT, is 
expected to have different effects on retention. These interaction terms enabled us to 
differentiate predicted effects of deployment and interpret them easily. Table 8 displays 
an explanation of each of the interaction terms used in the models.  
The GENDEP_GWOT variable was used as a difference-in-
difference estimator. It was utilized to measure the difference between the effect of 
deployments in pre- and post-GWOT for the control group and the effect of deployments 
in pre- and post-GWOT for the treatment group, as explained in the following table. The 
GWOT variable captured the effect of increasing operational tempo due to the GWOT. 
GENDEP captured the effect of deployments on behavioral attitudes of junior officers. 
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The interaction term between these two variables captured the effect of being deployed, 
compared to being not deployed, in the post-GWOT period, compared to the pre-GWOT 
period. 
 
 Control Group (1990-1995 cohorts)
Treatment Group 
(1996-2001 cohorts) Difference 
Pre-GWOT β0 β0 + β13GENDEP β13GENDEP 
Post-GWOT 






β14GWOT β14GWOT + 
β15GENDEP_GWOT 
β15GENDEP_GWOT
Table 7.   Difference-in-difference Estimator 
Likewise, all interaction terms behaved like a difference-in-
difference estimator for the category in which they were used.  
 
Interaction Term Definition  
GENDEP_GWOT =1 if deployed and experienced GWOT, 0 
otherwise  
ONEGENDEP_GWOT =1 if deployed only once and experienced 
GWOT, 0 otherwise 
TWOMOREGENDEP_GWOT =1 if deployed more than once and 
experienced GWOT, 0 otherwise 
DEPLESS_6_ GWOT =1 if deployed less than 6 months in total 
and experienced GWOT, 0 otherwise 
DEP6_12_ GWOT =1 if deployed between 6 months and 12 
months in total and experienced GWOT, 0 
otherwise 
DEPMORE_12_ GWOT =1 if deployed more than 12 months in 
total and experienced GWOT, 0 otherwise 
Table 8.   Explanation of Interaction Terms Used in the Models 
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Table 9 presents a summary of the variables that were used in our 
models and their expected signs. 
 
Variable Name Variable Type Expected Sign 
Demographic Variables 
Gender 
MALE Binary Base Case 
FEMALE Binary - 
Race/Ethnicity 
WHITE Binary Base Case 
BLACK Binary + 
HISPANIC Binary + 
OTHERRACE Binary + 
Marital Status 
JOINTMARRIAGE Binary + 
MARRIED Binary Base Case 
SINGLEWITHFAM Binary + 
SINGLEWOFAM Binary - 
Age 
AGE Continuous + 
Service Variables 
PRIORENLISTED Binary + 
Designator/Military Occupational Specialty 
SWO (NAVY) Binary + 
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Variable Name Variable Type Expected Sign 
SUPPLY (NAVY) Binary + 
OTHERMOS (NAVY) Binary Base Case 
COMBAT (MARINE CORPS) Binary + 
COMBATSUPPORT (MARINE CORPS) Binary Base Case  
Deployment Variables   
General Deployment Indicators 
GENDEP Binary + 
NODEP Binary Base Case 
Hostile Deployment Indicators 
HOSDEP Binary + 
NOHOSDEP Binary Base Case  
Being Deployed in Last 12 Months Prior to Stay/Leave Decision 
LAST12 Binary + 
Deployment Frequency Indicators 
ONEGENDEP Binary + 
TWOMOREGENDEP Binary + 
NODEP Binary  Base Case 
Deployment Duration Indicators 
DEPLESS_6 Binary + 
DEP6_12 Binary + 
DEPMORE_12 Binary - 
NODEP Binary Base Case  
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Variable Name Variable Type Expected Sign 
Hostile Deployment Frequency Indicators 
ONEHOSDEP Binary + 
TWOMOREHOSDEP Binary - 
Hostile Deployment Duration Indicators 
HOSDEPLESS_6 Binary + 
HOSDEPMORE_6 Binary - 
NODEP Binary Base Case  
Table 9.   Summary of Variables 
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V. ANALYSIS RESULTS 
A. DEPLOYMENT MODELS 
Three separate models were estimated to capture different aspects of 
deployments, namely being deployed, the number of deployments, and the duration of 
deployment. These are regarded as significant factors that affect the retention decisions of 
junior officers. Beside model-specific deployment variables, all three models included 
demographic and military background variables. Officers who graduated from the Naval 
Academy between 1990 and 1995 will be referred to as the control group and those who 
graduated between 1996 and 2001 as the treatment group in the following part of the 
study. 
Table 10 presents the results of deployment models for Navy junior officers. It 
demonstrates the effect of deployment, frequency, and duration on the continuation 
behavior at the initial decision point. Gender, marital status, experiencing a deployment 
in the past twelve months prior to the decision point, and the GWOT influence the 















 Retained Retained Retained 
female -0.592 -0.595           -0.591 
        (0.082)***        (0.082)***       (0.082)*** 
black 0.176 0.178 0.179 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) 
hispanic  0.112 0.114 0.109 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) 
otherrace 0.027 0.026 0.019 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) 
jointmarriage 0.862 0.865 0.867 
       (0.277)***     (0.277)**       (0.277)*** 
singlewithfam           -0.253           -0.254           -0.246 















singlewofam           -1.323           -1.324           -1.323 
      (0.060)***        (0.060)***      (0.060)*** 
age           -0.041 -0.042           -0.041 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
priorenlisted 1.243 1.273 1.233 
 (1.183) (1.186) (1.182) 
swo           -0.454           -0.455 -0.456 
      (0.067)***      (0.067)***        (0.067)*** 
supply           -1.062           -1.062 -1.060 
      (0.093)***       (0.093)***        (0.093)*** 
last12 1.289 1.245 1.290 
       (0.164)***       (0.165)***       (0.165)*** 
gendep 0.097   
 (0.119)   
gwot 0.830 0.831 0.831 
       (0.068)***       (0.068)***       (0.068)*** 
gendep_gwot 0.242   
 (0.169)   
onegendep  0.048  
  (0.122)  
twomoregendep  0.686  
      (0.337)**  
onegendep_gwot  0.254  
  (0.177)  
twomoregendep_gwot  0.009  
  (0.499)  
depless_6   0.482 
     (0.291)* 
dep6_12             -0.193 
   (0.222) 
depmore_12   0.114 
   (0.137) 
depless_6_gwot   0.259 
   (0.575) 
dep6_12_gwot   0.359 
   (0.416) 
depmore_12_gwot   0.216 
   (0.192) 
Constant 2.499 2.537 2.497 















Observations 6817 6817 6817 
LR chi2      1033.14      1037.9       1037.92 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 10.   Logit Retention Model Results for Navy Officers 
1. Navy Results 
a. General Deployment Model 
The model in Table 10, column 1, predicted the effect of being deployed, 
regardless of the region, and the frequency, or duration, of deployment. The results show 
that female officers have 45% lower odds of retention at the end of their MSO than male 
officers, controlling other variables. All the minority variables have positive effects on 
retention; minority officers are more likely to retain than white officers are. Marital status 
can be regarded as an important predictor of retention. Being single, either with or 
without dependents, has a negative effect on retention. Single officers without dependents 
have 74% lower odds of staying, and single officers with dependents 23% lower odds of 
staying, compared to married officers with everything else the same. However, being 
single with family is not statistically significant, meaning that marital status does not 
affect retention. Our results indicate a higher attrition rate for single officers, which 
complies with the findings of Fricker (2002). Age was expected to have a positive effect 
on retention, but our results yielded a negative effect. Nevertheless, the effect is not 
statistically significant. Prior enlistment was found to be an insignificant factor in the 
retention decision. For occupational specialty, we found that surface warfare officers 
have 35% lower and supply officers have 65% lower odds of retention compared to other 
specialties (both are statistically significant at the 1% significance level).  
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It would be reasonable to say that any kind of deployment that occurred 
during the last year of service prior to the end of a MSO would be a crucial factor that 
affects officers’ decisions. Our results support this assumption. According to the model, 
naval officers experiencing a deployment in their last year of obligated service have 
263% higher odds of retention. It is surprising to find that general deployment does not 
have a statistically significant effect on retention at the usual significance levels. On the 
other hand, being a member of cohorts who made their retention decision after 9/11 had a 
significant effect on retention. The treatment variable (GWOT) has a log odds of 0.83, an 
odds ratio of 2.29 (exp(0.83)=2.29), and is statistically significant. If an officer graduated 
from the Naval Academy between 1996 and 2001 and experienced a deployment, the 
odds of retention is 192% (exp(0.83+0.242)) higher than for officers who graduated 
earlier and were not deployed, after controlling for other variables.  
b. General Deployment Frequency Model 
The frequency model, shown in Table 10, column 2, predicted the effect 
of the number of deployments regardless of their duration. All the demographics have the 
same effect as in the general deployment model, except that joint marriage is no longer 
significant and single with family is now significant. Being a surface warfare and supply 
officer had the same lower retention effect. While having two or more deployments has a 
1.98 odds ratio, one deployment has only a 1.04 odds ratio in the pre-GWOT period. For 
officers who decided to stay or leave the military after 9/11, the odds ratio increased to 
2.002 for two or more deployments and to 1.35 for one deployment. Whereas the effect 
of one deployment was not significant, two or more deployments had a significant effect 
in the pre-GWOT period. Both deployment categories were insignificant in the post-
GWOT period, which means that the number of general deployments did not influence 
the retention behavior of junior officers after the GWOT.  
c. General Deployment Duration Model 
As another important aspect of deployment, duration was analyzed as 
shown in column 3 of Table 10. The variables used in the previous models maintain the 
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same effects. The odds ratios for the deployment length categories are 1.612, 0.824, and 
1.12 for deployments less than six months, six to twelve months, and more than twelve 
months, respectively. The effect of six to twelve months deployments and deployments of 
more than twelve months are insignificant, and deployments shorter than six months are 
significant only at the 10% level. One can infer that duration of the deployment was not a 
crucial factor for the retention decision for the Navy officers analyzed in this study. 
d. Results without the 1990, 1991, and 1992 Cohorts 
Table 11 shows the regression results. Due to the error in the coding of 
















 Retained Retained Retained 
female -0.734 -0.734 -0.734 
       (0.097)***        (0.097)***       (0.097)*** 
black 0.190 0.193 0.193 
 (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) 
hispanic  0.193 0.191 0.188 
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.125) 
otherrace 0.161 0.158 0.155 
 (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) 
jointmarriage 0.490 0.490 0.494 
   (0.292)*   (0.292)*   (0.292)* 
singlewithfam -0.498            -0.500 -0.292 
      (0.212)**      (0.212)**      (0.212)** 
singlewofam -1.452            -1.451 -1.454 
        (0.082)***        (0.082)***        (0.082)*** 
age -0.092            -0.092 -0.092 
      (0.037)**      (0.037)**      (0.037)** 
swo -0.085           -0.085 -0.087 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) 
supply -0.825           -0.825 -0.825 
        (0.104)***       (0.104)***       (0.104)*** 
last12             2.04 2.011 2.066 















gendep 0.004   
 (0.162)   
gwot 0.468 0.468 0.468 
      (0.082)***       (0.082)***      (0.082)*** 
gendep_gwot 0.219   
 (0.206)   
onegendep            -0.025  
  (0.168)  
twomoregendep  0.310  
  (0.470)  
onegendep_gwot  0.220  
  (0.215)   
twomoregendep_gwot  0.174  
  (0.605)  
depless_6   0.376 
   (0.399) 
dep6_12   -0.310 
   (0.354) 
depmore_12   -0.001 
   (0.187) 
depless_6_gwot   0.198 
   (0.647) 
dep6_12_gwot   0.226 
   (0.509) 
depmore_12_gwot   0.233 
   (0.233) 
Constant 4.254 4.273 4.258 
       (1.064)***       (0.605)***       (1.064)*** 
Observations 4405 4405 4405 
LR chi2        676.60        677.62        679.52 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses  
• significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 




Major changes appeared in the joint marriage, GWOT, and last12 
variables in all three models in Table 10. Service members who were married to another 
service member (jointmarriage) had 74% lower odds ratio than in Table 10. Another 
prominent change was observed in the effect of the GWOT. On average, officers who 
made their retention decision after the 9/11 attacks (GWOT) had 70% lower odds ratios 
of retention than officers in the pre-GWOT cohorts. The effect of experiencing a 
deployment in the past twelve months (last12) prior to the retention decision doubled 
compared to the original model results, as the log odds increased from 3.58 to 7.66. All 
the variables mentioned above still had a positive impact on continuation behavior, 
although their coefficients were smaller in magnitude. SWO still had a negative effect on 
retention, but the effect was much smaller than the original model. The supply variable 
had almost the same effect as in Table 10.  
2. Marine Corps Results 
Table 12 shows the results when the models used for the Navy are applied to 
Marine Corps data. Marine Corps and Army units are the main combatant forces of the 
United States military on the ground. They have taken the priority in dictating plans, 
specifically in the Global War on Terror. Since the declaration of the GWOT, they have 
experienced more hostile tours than their colleagues in the Navy and Air Force have. 
Therefore, we initially anticipated that the type, duration and frequency of deployments 
would be significant predictors on Marine Corps officers’ retention. However, Table 12 
shows that most of the deployment-related variables are statistically insignificant. 















 Retained Retained Retained 
Female 0.049 0.045 0.067 
 (0.257) (0.259) (0.259) 















     (0.288)**       (0.290)***       (0.290)*** 
Hispanic 0.140 0.162 0.145 
 (0.323) (0.322) (0.323) 
Otherrace           -0.199  -0.166  -0.209 
 (0.355) (0.357) (0.359) 
Jointmarriage           -0.171    -0.158  -0.207 
 (0.382) (0.383) (0.382) 
Singlewithfam           -1.317  -1.244 -1.196 
 (0.823) (0.821) (0.831) 
Singlewofam -1.572  -1.61  -1.605 
        (0.166)***      (0.168)***      (0.168)*** 
Age  -0.124  -0.114  -0.112 
  (0.064)*  (0.064)* (0.065)* 
Priorenlisted 0.894 0.829 0.896 
  (0.531)* (0.536)  (0.534)* 
Combatsupport -1.056  -1.047  -1.079 
      (0.157)***       (0.158)***      (0.159)*** 
last12 2.086 1.968 2.083 
      (0.362)***       (0.366)***       (0.369)*** 
gendep  0.335   
 (0.252)   
Gwot 0.744 0.759 0.763 
       (0.258)***      (0.259)***       (0.259)*** 
gendep_gwot 0.090   
 (0.319)   
onegendep   0.185  
  (0.271)  
twomoregendep   0.613  
      (0.310)**  
onegendep_gwot  0.069  
  (0.347)  
twomoregendep_gwot  0.251  
  (0.429)  
depless_6   0.064 
   (0.288) 
dep6_12   0.369 
   (0.330) 
depmore_12   0.855 
      (0.352)** 















   (0.382) 
dep6_12_gwot   0.143 
   (0.461) 
depmore_12_gwot    -0.636 
   (0.454) 
Constant 4.676 4.399 4.348 
     (1.913)**     (1.928)**      (1.930)** 
Observations 999 999 999 
LR chi2         241.63         247.80         248.13 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 12.   Logit Retention Regression Model Results For The Marine Corps for General 
Deployments 
(1) General Deployment Model. In column 1 of Table 12, of 
fourteen independent variables, only seven were statistically significant. The female 
variable has a positive but insignificant effect on retention. Contrary to the general 
perception about gender as a retention barrier, it does not appear to influence retention 
behavior in the Marine Corps, at least among USNA graduates. Female officers made up 
10% of the Marine Corps sample used in this study. They are generally assigned to 
support MOS, rather than to active combatant military occupational specialties. This 
assignment might be another reason for the insignificant effect of gender on retention. 
There is a slight inconsistency for race variables. African-American officers have higher 
log odds to retain compared to white officers, and it was statistically significant in the 
general deployment model. The Hispanic variable has a positive effect and the other race 
variable has a negative coefficient. The model yielded inconsistent effects for race, and 
two of the categories were not significant.  
Marital status plays a big role in predicting service members’ 
retention decisions. Compared to being married, all other marital status categories are less 
likely to stay in the military. However, among these groups the single without family 
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variable is the only significant one. Age was expected to have a positive effect on 
retention, but the model produced negative and insignificant effects. Prior enlistment 
positively influenced retention (significant at level of 10%). Combat support officers 
have 65% (1-exp(-1.056)) lower odds of retention than combat officers who have the 
same characteristics. The sign of the “last12” variable signifies that deployments in the 
last year before deciding to stay or resign have a positive effect on retention. As Fricker 
(2002) noted, another explanation for this positive effect might be that the nondeployed 
officers’ separation rate is so high that it makes the retention rate of deployed officers 
seem high. The “Gendep” variable captures the effect of deployment regardless of the 
operational tempo caused by the GWOT. It has a positive sign, but it is statistically 
insignificant. The treatment group officers have 110% (1 – exp(0.743)) higher odds of 
retention as opposed to the control group. The ‘Gendep_GWOT’ variable predicts the 
impact of the deployment environment dictated by the GWOT on retention. It turns out to 
be insignificant, which means deployments do not influence the retention of officers who 
graduated from the Naval Academy between 1996 and 2001 in our model. 
(2) General Deployment Frequency Model. The results in column 
3 of Table 12 indicate that demographics have almost the same impact as in the general 
Marine Corps model. As expected, prior enlisted officers are more inclined to remain and 
be career officers. Members of combat military occupational specialties who experience 
positive aspects of deployment, such as increased job satisfaction and applying theory to 
real situations, are more likely to stay in the military than members who have other 
occupational specialties. The “GWOT” variable has a positive and significant effect. 
Being a member of the 1996-2001 cohorts appears to be a key factor of the decision to 
stay. For the effect of deployment frequencies, in column 3 of Table 12 we observed that 
one deployment causes lower retention rate, while two or more deployments does the 
opposite. That is, if an officer experiences two or more deployments, he or she has 84% 
higher odds of retention compared to nondeployed officers. Deployments experienced, no 
matter how many times, do not appear to affect the continuation decision of treatment 
group members.  
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(3) General Deployment Duration Model. In column 3 of Table 12, 
there are nine significant variables out of eighteen variables in the model. Demographic 
and service variables have the same effect as in the previous two models. The key 
variables in this model were the deployment duration categories. For the control group, 
having a total deployment duration less than a year does not influence the stay or leave 
decision. Among the duration variables, total deployment duration longer than a year 
affects service members’ decisions to stay in the military in a positive manner. 
b. Hostile Deployment Models 
Theoretically, a hostile deployment variable should have a negative 
retention effect, but previous studies revealed a positive effect on retention behavior. This 
effect was generally attributed to occupational and personal satisfaction benefits, as well 




Model   
(4) 
Hostile Deployment 
Frequency Model  
(5) 
Hostile Deployment 
Duration Model  
(6) 
 Retained Retained Retained 
female 0.061 0.067 0.061 
 (0.258) (0.258) (0.258) 
black 0.714 0.717 0.715 
    (0.286)**     (0.286)**     (0.286)** 
hispanic  0.140 0.145 0.140 
 (0.322) (0.322) (0.322) 
otherrace  -0.174   -0.170  -0.172 
 (0.354) (0.354) (0.354) 
jointmarriage   -0.128   -0.123  -0.128 
 (0.381) (0.381) (0.381) 
singlewithfam  -1.297   -1.297  -1.295 
 (0.819) (0.819) (0.819) 
singlewofam  -1.533   -1.532  -1.533 
      (0.164)***       (0.164)***       (0.164)*** 
age  -0.130   -0.130  -0.130 
    (0.063)**     (0.063)**     (0.063)** 
priorenlisted 0.910 0.917 0.908 
   (0.532)*   (0.532)*   (0.532)* 
combatsupport  -1.104   -1.102  -1.104 




Model   
(4) 
Hostile Deployment 
Frequency Model  
(5) 
Hostile Deployment 
Duration Model  
(6) 
Last12 2.252 2.242 2.257 
      (0.360)***      (0.361)***      (0.364)*** 
hosdep  -0.070   
 (0.265)   
gwot 0.730 0.729 0.730 
      (0.163)***       (0.163)***      (0.163)*** 
onehosdep    -0.117  
  (0.278)  
twomorehosdep  0.289  
  (0.732)  
hosdepless_6    -0.058 
   (0.296) 
hosdepmore_6    -0.109 
   (0.498) 
Constant 5.094 5.103 5.085 
       (1.858)***       (1.859)***       (1.860)*** 
Observations 999 999 999 
LR chi2         235.55         235.84         235.55 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 13.   Logit Retention Regression Model Results For The Marine Corps for Hostile 
Deployments 
(1) Hostile Deployment Model. The positive sign of the female 
variable indicates female officers retain at a higher rate than their male peers, holding 
everything else the same. However, the female variable is not statistically significant. For 
the race and ethnicity variables, all categories proved insignificant except the one for 
African-American officers, who have 104% higher odds ratio of retention than white 
officers. Compared to married officers, all others preferred not to retain, but only the 
single without dependents variable was statistically significant. Contrary to general 
beliefs, age turned out to have a negative impact on the continuation of junior Marine 
Corps officers in our model. Prior enlistment had a positive effect as expected. If a 
service member was in a combat support unit, he or she had lower log odds of retention  
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than an officer in a combat unit. Experiencing a deployment prior to making a retention 
decision in the final year is a key factor that affects the decision of service members in a 
positive manner.  
We had anticipated finding a positive effect of hostile deployment, 
in accordance with their preliminary analysis (Figures 10 and 15). However, the hostile 
deployment variable had a very small negative coefficient, which was practically 
negligible. The sign of the GWOT variable signifies that living through 9/11 is strongly 
and positively associated with the retention decision. 
(2) Hostile Deployment Frequency Model. As mentioned in the 
general Navy and general Marine Corps deployment models, the effect of demographic 
and service variables did not change throughout the models.  The results showed higher 
retention propensities for officers who experienced deployment in the last twelve months 
and a different effect for the two-tour duration categories. While deploying to hostile 
regions once decreased the likelihood of continuation, two or more tours positively 
contributed to the retention decision for Marine Corps members, though both proved 
insignificant. Besides, the result for two or more hostile deployments can be neglected 
due to a very small number of observations, namely seventeen.  
(3) Hostile Deployment Duration Model. For the duration model, 
as in previous models, the odds of retention for African-American officers were 
significantly higher than for their white colleagues, while other minority officers did not 
show the same attitude statistically according to the model. Moreover, the duration 
category results also exhibited a negative impact for Marine Corps officers. Both duration 
categories yielded a negative but statistically insignificant reaction of service members to 
deployment duration categories, indicating that members did not necessarily regard the 
length of duration as a critical aspect while making their continuation decision. It might 
be rationalized that they see the dangerous deployments as a part of a military career. 
Nevertheless, saying that time spent under imminent threat would not have any influence 
on the continuation decision does not seem sensible, and one explanation for this result 
could be self-selection. 
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B. TEST OF MODELS 
A likelihood ratio test was conducted to determine if deployment and period 
variables were jointly significant in the models. The null hypothesis was that deployment, 
GWOT, and the interaction of these two variables were not jointly significant and had no 
effect on explaining the retention behavior of service members. The alternative 
hypothesis was that at least one of the variables was associated with the retention 
decision. The likelihood ratio test is based on the same concept as the F-test in a linear 
model (Wooldridge, 2006). The results can be evaluated in a way similar to that of the 
OLS regression F-test. 
According to the results of the likelihood ratio test, as shown in Table 14, the null 
hypothesis was rejected for all models. That is, the deployment, GWOT, and interaction 
variables were jointly significant and at least one of them was associated with the 
retention decision of service members in each model.  
Model LR Chi2 DF Pr>Chisq 
Navy General Deployment (1) 209.3 15 0.000 
Navy General Deployment Frequency (2)   214.07 17 0.000 
Navy General Deployment Duration (3)   214.08 19 0.000 
Marine Corps General Deployment  (1)     27.67 14 0.000 
Marine General Deployment Frequency  (2)     33.83 16 0.000 
Marine General Deployment Duration (3)     34.17 18 0.000 
Marine Corps Hostile Deployment (4)     21.58 13 0.000 
Marine Hostile  Deployment Frequency (5)      21.87 14 0.000 
Marine Hostile Deployment Duration (6)     21.59 14 0.000 
Table 14.   Likelihood Ratio Test Results 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The Navy and Marine Corps spend a lot of money on recruiting, training and 
developing their officer corps. Retaining these trained personnel is a key issue for 
military manpower planners. As the main focus of this thesis, the authors believe that an 
understanding of the features of deployments (type, length, and frequency) as crucial 
factors in junior officer retention is a key component of manning issues for the future of 
the Navy and the Marine Corps.  
Naval Academy students who graduated between 1990 and 1995 were taken as 
the control group. These officers made their retention decisions before the 9/11 attacks. 
The 9/11 attacks are taken to be the treatment effect in this study. Officers who graduated 
between 1996 and 2001 are taken as treatment group; they experienced more frequent 
deployments, with less rest time between them. Although this thesis is limited, some 
factors affecting the retention behavior of USNA-graduate junior officers were identified 
here. The DMDC data used in this study is the biggest handicap of the study. Because of 
the errors mentioned in Chapter 3, it may be misleading to draw firm conclusions based 
on this data. Nonetheless, some clear patterns emerge in the data. 
1. Naval Officers 
The retention rate of junior officers follows a horizontal pattern between 60% and 
70% until 2001. The Navy enjoyed a ten-percentage point jump in the retention rate, 
presumably as a result of 9/11, until 2005. Then, the data revealed a declining trend in 
retention starting from 2005. Single officers without dependents preferred to leave the 
military at a higher rate than their married peers did. The proportion of married officers 
decreased by eight percentage points in the post-GWOT period in comparison with the 
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pre-GWOT period.9 Deployment appeared to contribute to higher retention rates. An 
increasing number of deployments were associated with higher retention rates. 
Nevertheless, the effect of deployment duration was not so clear in either the pre- or post-
GWOT period. When the 1990, 1991, and 1992 cohorts were excluded, the results of the 
two models were very similar.  
In accordance with the literature and preliminary findings of this study, female 
officers and single service members, regardless of the number of dependents, were less 
likely to remain in the military, and married officers together with members of minority 
categories had a higher propensity to stay in the military. Contrary to previous findings, 
age turned out to have a negative effect on the continuation behavior of service members 
in these models. SWO and supply officers leave the military at higher rates than their 
peers in other designators do. Prior enlisted service members had a notably higher 
probability of staying, as expected. The effect of being deployed in the last year of an 
officer’s MSO considerably increased the odds of continuation. If an officer made his or 
her retention decision after 2001, he or she was more likely to continue military service. 
All aspects of deployment had a positive influence on retention, except for deployments 
with duration of between six and twelve months. Increasing operational tempo, in terms 
of the number of deployments and the associated duration, caused retention rates to 
increase among naval junior officers.  
2. Marine Corps Officers  
Female officers tended to join the Marine Corps at higher rates after 9/11, as their 
proportion of the force increased by ten percentage points in the post-GWOT period. A 
decrease in the number of married officers was seen in the Marine Corps as in the Navy. 
Although the results in Table 4 alone seem to indicate a decrease in the percentage of 
deployed officers, this would be deceptive. As the number of observations in the sample 
is taken into consideration, it becomes obvious that more officers experienced  
                                                 
9 When single officers leave the military at higher rates, the proportion of married officers is expected 
to rise. On the other hand, as Karney and Crown (2007) described in their study, marital dissolution rates 
were very high in the late 1990s, which makes up the post-GWOT period in the thesis.  
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deployments in the post-GWOT period. The positive effect of deployment frequency and 
the mixed effect of deployment duration are observed in the Marine Corps, too. The only 
exception is that longer hostile deployments resulted in higher retention rates.   
Regression analyses of Marine Corps retention models indicate that gender, race, 
marital status, being in a combat MOS, and deployment aspects significantly affected the 
retention decisions of Marine Corps service members. Being female, white, African-
American, Hispanic, single, in combat military occupational specialties, and all types of 
general deployments positively contributed to higher retention. However, hostile 
deployments, regardless of frequency and the length of deployment, decreased the 
likelihood of retaining, except for two or more deployments. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Despite the fact that challenges may be regarded as a part and reality of military 
life for career officers, the appeal of higher income and a risk-free and stable 
environment in civilian life may negatively affect an officer’s way of looking at 
upcoming deployments. Experiencing family separations and life-threatening situations 
have been the natural consequences of the war on terrorism. Therefore, understanding the 
actual situation, the viewpoint of officers, their worries and expectations, and coming up 
with a better understanding of issues about the effect of increasing operational tempo on 
continuation decisions will become a critical issue. 
It should always be kept in mind that these results are produced from a data file 
with some data errors. In particular, the first three cohorts covered in this study have no 
information about designator/MOS, which made them difficult to analyze.  
Moreover, the variables included in the models are not the only ones that explain 
retention behavior. Variables such as military pay, the civilian/military pay ratio, job 
satisfaction, expectation from military such as deployment time, time spent with family, 
and quality of leadership also explain retention. This study looked at the number of 
officers, not quality. A proxy for officer quality may reveal different results that will be 
in the interest of both services. 
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Both services should seek ways to compensate for the negative effects of 
deployments with monetary incentives, because monetary issues make up the top reason 
for leaving the military.10 
Hostile deployment is inevitable in the future of the Marine Corps. However, 
Marine Corps headquarters can examine aspects of deployments thoroughly to detect and 
minimize the negative effect as well as maximize the benefits of deployment. The finding 
that any length and number of hostile deployments causes lower retention, although 
general deployments cause increased retention, points to a future research topic.  
Current data allowed the authors to analyze cohorts up to the 2001 cohort, which 
is the beginning of the GWOT. Increased operational tempo might have different effects 
on cohorts after 2001. Thus, a contemporary study could be performed with much more 
up-to-date data to get a better grip on the retention behavior of service members in the 
light of previous changes in deployment and hostility issues like perstempo and threat 
levels. 
Only USNA graduates, who are known to have higher retention rates, were 
analyzed in this thesis. A broader study that encompasses all accession sources would 
give a more in-depth understanding of the effect of deployments. 
Actual data were analyzed in this study. A comparison of a survey of service 
members’ intentions to stay in the military based on their expectations and actual 
outcomes could be another interesting topic for further research.  
                                                 
10 It was the first reason for leaving the military, with 28% among the top five reasons, according to 
1999 survey results (Other reasons accounted for 30% in total). (GAO report, 2000). 
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